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Introduction
The discussion on global imbalances has attracted a lot of interest and controversy in the last decade (see e.g. Bernanke, 2005; Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2012) . In the mean time, regional imbalances within the euro area are on the international policy agenda, not the least due to the ongoing twin debt and banking crises. While the current account for the aggregated euro area is nearly balanced, a growing and persistent divergence has developed among EMU countries since the establishment of the monetary union in 1999 with considerable current account deficits particularly in some southern European countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (see figure 1 ). Source: World Development Indicators online database.
The debate on these imbalances has so far mainly focused on the role of capital flows for real appreciation, the subsequent loss of competitiveness, and the deterioration of the capital account, e.g. Arghyrou and Chortareas, 2008; Belke and Dreger, 2011; Zemanek et al., 2009. Independently of the euro developments there is active discussion on the role of fiscal policy for the current account under the heading of the so called twin deficits literature (see e.g. Baxter, 1995; Beetsma et al., 2008; Monacelli and Perotti, 2010; Ali Abbas et al., 2010; Bussière et al., 2010; Bouakez et al., 2011) . This analysis typically alludes to the goods market channel with an increase in government spending raising the demand for domestic goods, appreciating the real exchange rate through relative price changes and thereby worsening the trade balance. Although there is some controversy on the empirics of this debate, especially concerning the relationship between government spending, real exchange rate and current account deficit in the US. (see e.g. Corsetti and Müller, 2006; Kim and Roubini, 2008; Monacelli and Perotti, 2010; Bouakez et al., 2011) , Ali Abbas et al. (2010) reveal a statistically significant association between fiscal policy and the current account. They show for a large country sample of 124 countries over the period 1985 -2007 that an 1 percent increase in government consumption worsens the current account by about 0.3 percent of GDP on impact, becoming insignificant after 2 -4 years.
1 Likewise Bussière et al. (2010) show for 21 OECD countries over the period 1960 -2003 , that an increase in the government budget deficit by 1 percentage point of GDP lowers the current account by 0.14 percentage points of GDP on average. In the context of the European Union, Beetsma et al. (2008) find for 14 EU countries over the period 1970 -2004 that an increase in public spending of 1 percent of GDP raises GDP by 1.2 percent, which leads through a decrease in net exports to a fall of the trade balance by 0.5 percent of GDP. Since government spending increases the budget deficit by 0.7 percent, the study supports the twin deficit hypothesis in the EU context.
In order to reduce the growing current account deficits in the southern Euro Area countries, Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) discuss several policy options in a currency union. They emphasize that due to the centralization of monetary policy, fiscal policy is perhaps the most crucial macroeconomic policy tool. They point out that especially in the current twin debt crisis, fiscal consolidation will remain crucial going forward, to lower public debt and reduce domestic demand pressure. The stabilization potential of fiscal policy is supported by Catalán and Lama (2006) . They show for the Spanish economy that an 1 percent exogenous fall in real government spending in one quarter improves the current account balance by about 0.16 percentage points of GDP over the first year. 2 Most recently a study on fiscal consolidation and their implications for the current account was published by the IMF (2011). 3 They find that a fiscal consolidation of 1 percent of GDP results in an improvement in the current account of over 0.5 percent of GDP within two years. This relationship comes not only through a decline in domestic demand but also from an increase in exports as a result of a depreciation of the domestic currency. They point out that the current account adjustment is just as large when the nominal exchange rate is fixed, but the correction is more painful resulting in higher economic contraction and higher real exchange rate depreciation.
Figure 2 depicts exemplarily the development of government spending and current account balance for three current account deficit countries in the center of the ongoing financial crisis debate, namely Greece, Portugal and Spain. Source: IHS Global Insight.
Note:
Deviations from HP-filter trend.
2 Thus, a reduction in real government spending of about 1 ½ percentage points of GDP would improve the current account by 1 percent of GDP. Government spending includes consumption and investment and was 23 percent of GDP in 1994 GDP in -2004 This chapter in the World Economic Outlook 2011 -Slowing Growth, Rising Risks -refers on the background paper by Bluedorn and Leigh (2011) . 
Government spending
Typically an increase in government spending is accompanied by a decrease in the current account with a short delay. This could indicate that for small open economies with large current account deficits, fiscal policy could be an important policy instrument to stabilize the current account.
The DSGE approach provides a comprehensive framework to analyze fiscal and monetary policy under alternative exchange rate regimes, i.e. being a member of the euro area or not. While the coordination and stabilizing properties of monetary and fiscal policy are at the core of the extensive DSGE literature, e.g. Beetsma and Jensen, 2005; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007; Ferrero, 2009; Vogel et al., 2011 , there are to our knowledge only few studies that focus on the role of monetary or fiscal policy to stabilize the current account. Ferrero et al. (2008) analyze the effects of alternative monetary policy regimes on the behavior of aggregate variables under two different current account rebalancing scenarios, but without considering fiscal policy rules. Di Nisticò (2008, 2011) study the role of stabilization policies for productivity shocks on the dynamics of net foreign assets in a two country DSGE model with overlapping generations. In addition to alternative monetary policy rules, they use a primary-deficit feedback rule for fiscal policy with countercyclical response to the output gap and the stock of public debt. For a positive productivity shock they show how a low degree of fiscal discipline, i.e. the extent to which fiscal policy reacts to outstanding debt, leads to a deterioration of the net foreign asset position in the medium run.
Our contribution to this work is to link fiscal policy rules directly to external imbalances and analyze the stabilizing properties of fiscal policy for current account imbalances.
The current financial crisis makes clear how current account imbalances can cause far reaching damage to financial stability. As fiscal policy is the major policy instrument left with the individual members of a currency union it seems interesting and necessary to analyze the potential of fiscal policy rules to stabilize the current account.
Specifically as the European Commission explicitly looks with her scoreboard framework into the process of macroeconomic imbalances (see European Commission, 2012), a better understanding of policy rules to stabilize the current account might be of particular interest. premium. This debt-elastic interest rate is related to the net foreign asset position.
Hence, if the economy is a net borrower, domestic households are charged with a risk premium on the foreign interest rate. Due to the loss of an autonomous monetary policy within a currency union, we focus our analysis on the potential of alternative fiscal policy rules to stabilize the current account.
Households
The domestic economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely living households whose preferences are given by:
where t N is labor input, 0 1 < β < is the discount factor and t t1 H hC − ≡ describes the external habit formation of the household. The parameters , 0 σ ϕ > are the inverse elasticities of intertemporal substitution (or coefficient of relative risk aversion) and labor supply, respectively. t C is a composite consumption index defined by ( )
H,t C and F,t C are CES aggregators of the quantities of domestic and foreign goods:
where 0 η > is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The 
The left hand side corresponds to the uses of the resources. 
Assuming symmetry across all i goods, the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and foreign goods implies the demand functions ( )
and
where the consumer price index (CPI) is defined as
.
The following optimality conditions, derived by maximizing equation (1) subject to constraint (4), must hold in equilibrium: 
Equation (9) gives us the first order condition of the consumer's problem for making the intratemporal choice between labor and leisure. It states that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor is equal to the real wage at any point of time. The intertemporal first order condition is given by equation (10), which is the standard Euler equation for the holding of domestic bonds. Similarly, equation (11) is the optimality condition for the holding of foreign bonds.
Following the small open economy literature (see, e.g., Beltran and Draper, 2008) , the small open economy is assumed to be of negligible size relative to the rest of the world, which allows us to treat the latter as a closed economy. For the foreign economy, output equals domestic consumption and CPI inflation equals domestic inflation.
Domestic Producers
Differentiated domestic goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms owned by consumers. Each firm produces with a linear technology represented by the production function t t t Y (i) A N (i) = , where t A is an exogenous productivity shock. We further assume that firms set prices in a staggered fashion as in Calvo (1983) . Hence, in any period t only ( ) H 1− θ firms are allowed to adjust their prices and maximize their expected discounted value of profits
is the real marginal cost.
T t H
− θ is the probability that the domestic firm will not be able to adjust its price during the next ( )
The first order condition is then
Retail Firms
For incomplete exchange rate pass-through we follow Monacelli (2003) . Retail firms import foreign differentiated goods and have a small degree of pricing power because they are assumed to be monopolistically competitive. When selling imported goods to domestic consumers they will charge a mark-up over their cost. In the short run, this creates a wedge between the world market price of foreign goods paid by importing firms ( ) * t F,t e P and the domestic currency price of these goods when they are sold to consumers ( ) F,t P . The so called "law of one price (l.o.p.) gap" (see Monacelli, 2003 ) is defined as:
Retail firms also operate under Calvo-style price setting, with F θ being the fraction of firms not allowed to set prices optimally in any period t . These maximize the expected stream of discounted profits
The associated first order condition yields:
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
Because we depart from the assumption of complete risk-sharing and allow for incomplete asset markets, we derive the uncovered interest rate parity condition through the asset-pricing condition in equations (10) and (11), which determine domestic and foreign bond holdings:
In periods when the economy is a net borrower (net lender), the domestic interest rate is higher (lower) than the foreign interest rate. Thus, movements in the net foreign asset position affect the interest rate differential of the domestic and foreign economy.
Government
To investigate the potential stabilizing effects of fiscal policy to correct current account imbalances by regulating domestic demand, we assume that the government only purchases domestically-produced goods. The public consumption index is given by ( )
where H,t G (i) is the quantity of domestic good i purchased by government. For any given level of public consumption, the government allocates expenditures across goods in order to minimize total cost. Minimization of H H P G under restriction (16) yields the government demand function:
Government spending is financed either through lump-sum taxes 4 to domestic households t T or by nominal debt denominated in local currency t B . This yields the government's flow budget constraint, in nominal terms:
where H,t t G T − denotes the nominal primary deficit (see Di Giorgio and Nisticò, 2011; Corsetti et al., 2009) . 5 The detailed government spending feedback rules are defined in section 3.
Terms of Trade, Real Exchange Rate and the Current Account
Terms of trade are defined as
The domestic terms of trade is the price of foreign goods (imports) per unit of domestic goods (exports). An increase in t S is therefore equivalent to an increase in competitiveness. The real exchange rate is defined as
the ratio of CPIs expressed in a common currency, where an increase in t Q implies a depreciation of the home currency and thus an increase in competitiveness.
Finally, real net foreign assets evolve according to
where t NX denotes net exports and is the difference between output and absorption:
The current account reflects the change in real net foreign assets:
4 . We use lump-sum taxes for simplicity, because they do not directly affect intertemporal decisions of the households. 5 The introduction of an explicit tax feedback rule with a parameter that captures the responsiveness of taxes to government debt, as in Corsetti (2009) , gives no further insights and is therefore omitted. 
The derivation of the log-linear model is shown in appendix B, equation (35) to (53).
The design of the monetary policy rules with respect to the exchange rate regime is described in section 3.
The foreign economy
We follow the small open economy literature and assume that the foreign economy is large enough to be characterized by the closed-economy version of the model above. It is reasonable to interpret that the foreign country represents the rest of the euro area and can be fully described by the following dynamic equations:
and 
where i*,t ε is an exogenous monetary policy shock.
Monetary and fiscal policy: Targeting rules vs. instrument rules
Both, outside of and within a currency union the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies affects macroeconomic adjustments. Concerning the design of alternative monetary regimes and fiscal policy rules and their response to current account imbalances, we distinguish between (I) simple instrument rules and (II) optimal policy rules. 6 The advantage of simple rules is that they are easy to implement and for the public to understand. In order to compare the simple rules with an optimal policy we study an optimal policy rule under discretion where government takes private expectations as given and re-optimizes the policy each period. The instrument rules of our model are structured as follows:
Before monetary union the monetary authorities of both countries act independently and are assumed to follow a Taylor-rule (see Taylor, 1993 ): 
Concerning fiscal policy, the governments' real flow budget constraint is defined as:
6 According to Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) and Svensson (2000 Svensson ( , 2003 , targeting rules determine the optimal policy responses given a set of objectives. It minimizes the objective loss function that deviates from a target variable. 7 Some theoretical and empirical literature on monetary policy rules examines a feedback to output growth rather than to output gap (see, e.g., Walsh, 2003; Stracca, 2006; Choi and Wen, 2010 
where g ρ is the degree of instrument smoothing and g b ca , , ω ω ω are relative weights for output growth, the stock of public debt, and the current account, respectively. The residual term g,t ε is an exogenous fiscal policy shock. We use this enhanced feedback rule to investigate the dynamic implications of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. The parameter g ω determines to which degree fiscal policy is used to stabilize output growth. 9 The automatic stabilizer includes a 1-quarter delay for taking into account an implementation or reaction lag. 10 To account for the aim of fiscal discipline we follow, To analyze the stabilization potential of a current account stabilizing fiscal policy, we introduce an additional feedback to lagged current account. 13 The parameter ca ω measures the extent to which fiscal policy is used to stabilize current account imbalances. More specifically, if the home country runs a current account deficit, the fiscal authority should reduce government spending to increase net exports, thereby diminishing the external deficit.
Considering (II), a targeting rule implies the use of all relevant available information in order to minimize a loss function over expected future deviations of the target variable from the target level (see Rudebusch and Svensson, 1998) . Following e.g. Gali and
Monacelli (2005); Moons et al. (2007) and Svensson (2003) , we consider an intertemporal loss function in quarter t :
with the period loss function
where y g ca , , λ λ λ are the weights on output growth, government spending, and current account, respectively. Following the optimal policy literature, we set the relative weight on output growth to y 1 λ = and account for costs of fiscal policy intervention by assigning g λ to 0.2 (see e.g. Kirsanova et al., 2007; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007; Gali and Monacelli, 2008) . We introduce the current account with a weight of ca 0.5 λ = to account for the emergence of external imbalances in the loss function.
As highlighted in Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) 
Calibration
We parameterize the model on a quarterly frequency based on previous studies. The parameter values refer to empirical findings from the small open economy literature, most of them for the euro area (see, e.g., Gali and Monacelli, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2002 , 2005 Ferrero, 2009) , allowing for difficulties in changing government spending. Depending on the response coefficient ca ω , we distinguish between ca 0 ω = and ca 1.5 ω = . 17 An overview of the model calibration is given in table A1 at the appendix.
Policy rules and current account dynamics
In this section we study the effects of different shocks on macroeconomic variables, especially the current account dynamics, under alternative monetary regimes and policy rules. 18 Within the scenario, we distinguish between the effects of being outside and inside of the European Monetary Union.
19
Concerning the design of fiscal policy rules to correct current account imbalances, we analyze the following scenarios: (i) no active fiscal policy, t g 0 = , (ii) a conventional fiscal policy without current account response, ca 0 ω = , (iii) a current account stabilizing fiscal policy as in equation (31) We concentrate our analysis on productivity shocks and risk premium shocks, which are seen as main driving forces of current account imbalances within the euro area (see Belke and Dreger, 2011) . All shocks are assumed to be unanticipated (stochastic), to occur in period 0, and to be uncorrelated. 17 We provide some insights to the robustness and relative efficiency of the fiscal rule by displaying efficiency frontiers of both, fiscal smoothing parameter g ρ and the feedback term ca ω in section 5.
The dynamic response to a negative productivity shock
We assume that the productivity shock evolves as a stationary AR(1) process: t a t 1 a , t a a − = ρ +ε with a persistence parameter a 0.7 ρ = . 20 Table 1 gives an overview of the standard deviations of macroeconomic variables to a negative productivity shock under the four alternative fiscal policy rules in the non-EMU scenario. Furthermore, the current account deficit is aggravated via the accumulation of foreign debts and the households' efforts to smooth consumption.
When fiscal policy reacts according to rule (ii), government raises spending in order to stabilize output. 21 The discrepancies to scenario (iii) in which fiscal policy responds to the current account deficit are shown by the dotted lines in figure 1 . In order to reduce the current account deficit, government spending decreases. Therefore, fiscal policy can stabilize not only the real exchange rate and the current account, but also consumption and net foreign assets. A smaller increase of the nominal interest rate and an almost constant inflation decreases the real interest rate and stabilizes consumption, accompanied with less accumulated foreign debts. These stabilizing effects of macro variables are more efficient compared to fiscal policy rule (ii), but with a deterioration of the output in the short run. This increased vulnerability is confirmed by the dynamic responses in figure 3 , which
show both, the dynamic responses for a negative productivity shock in the non-EMU scenario and the EMU scenario. Due to the loss of an autonomous monetary authority and the adoption of the euro, the nominal exchange rate is now exogenous for the small open economy. The small increase in the nominal interest rate is not induced by monetary policy, but via a positive risk premium, because the economy becomes a net borrower.
Entry into EMU implies a higher variability and more persistence in the adjustment process of some macroeconomic variables, e.g. the real exchange rate. A more persistent appreciation and a decrease in competitiveness produce higher negative output growth and higher current account deficits. As in the non-EMU scenario, stabilizing the current account is accompanied with higher output variability. Although a current account stabilizing fiscal policy plays an important role to reduce the Variable Standard Deviations in % (EMU scenario) 
The dynamic response to a negative risk premium shock
A specific development during the establishment of EMU was the sharp drop in longrun interest rates, which was associated with a drastic decline of government bond spreads within the euro area (see figure A1 in the appendix) . We analyze such a negative risk premium shock, defined as a stationary AR(1) process: where risk ρ is set to 0.9 to accommodate the long persistence. Figure 4 shows the dynamic responses corresponding to fiscal rules (ii) and (iii).
Figure 4: Impulse response functions for a negative risk premium shock in a non-EMU scenario.
Note:
The solid line is the dynamic response of conventional fiscal rule (ii); the dotted line shows the current account stabilizing fiscal rule (iii).
Similar to negative productivity shock, we start analyzing the dynamic responses in the non-EMU scenario. 22 . A negative risk premium shock lowers nominal interest rates and induces an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The loss in competitiveness lowers output and the current account. A decrease in domestic inflation, caused by lower marginal costs, reduces the real interest rate and raises consumption. Due to the decrease in output, conventional fiscal policy (solid line) increase government spending 22 The standard deviations for the risk premium shock in the non-EMU and EMU scenario can be found in table A2 and A3 at the appendix. decreases government spending and reduces the variability of real exchange rate and current account deficit. Analogously to the productivity shock, the stabilizing effects for the current account are accompanied by a higher variability of output.
In the next step we analyze the effects when the small open economy is inside the EMU.
Considering only the stabilizing effects for fiscal rules (ii) and (iii) in the EMU scenario (*-marked lines in figure 5) , similar results as for the non-EMU scenario become evident. Hence, a fiscal response to the current account (*-dotted lines) stabilizes the current account and real exchange rate, but is accompanied with higher variability of the output. Comparing the dynamic responses for both scenarios, the EMU scenario reveals remarkable effects for the variability of macroeconomics variables that are contrary to those for the negative productivity shock. Therefore, entry into EMU diminishes the volatility for most macroeconomic variables, especially in the first four quarters. This is due to the absence of nominal exchange rate fluctuations. In the non-EMU scenario, nominal exchange rate appreciates rapidly of about 3% and remains almost at the higher level. This leads to a stronger appreciation of the real exchange rate and a more drastic decline in output which worsens the current account. Due to the loss of monetary policy in the EMU scenario, nominal interest rate is more affected by a negative risk premium shock. Therefore, the increase in consumption variability is caused by a sharp decrease in the real interest rate.
Comparing the stabilizing properties of alternative fiscal policy rules, similar results as for the negative productivity shock become evident. A countercyclical fiscal response to the current account stabilizes most macroeconomic variables better than a conventional countercyclical response to output, independently of the underlying exchange rate regime. But, stabilizing the current account via fiscal policy intervention is accompanied by higher variability of output. Furthermore, on the contrary to the productivity shock, entry into EMU implies lower variability of most macroeconomic variables, e.g. output, real exchange rate, current account, but a higher persistence in the adjustment process of the current account. The higher variability in the first four quarters of the non-EMU scenario is due to the high and persistent nominal exchange rate appreciation which leads to a higher real exchange rate appreciation. The decrease in competitiveness produces higher negative output growth and higher current account deficits.
Robustness
For a better insight in the robustness of our simulation results, we check the relative efficiency of alternative values for fiscal smoothing g ρ and current account feedback term ca ω for a negative productivity shock. Therefore, we run simulations over a range of the parameters in the interval [ ] 0;0.9 and [ ] -1;2 in steps of 0.1 and 0.25 , respectively. Assuming monetary policy follows the rules according to (28) and (27) for the non-EMU and EMU scenario, figure 6 shows the efficiency of an increasing smoothing parameter with respect to the variances of inflation and output growth for a negative productivity shock. The other parameters of the fiscal policy rule follow the baseline calibration as in equation (31) Figure 6 shows the differences between the two monetary regimes. As can be seen, the government faces a trade-off between stabilizing output and inflation in both scenarios.
The trade-off diminishes the less flexible the government is to adjust fiscal policy. The minimum in the non-EMU scenario is at a fiscal persistence of around 0.5, whereas it is only from 0.8 onwards in the EMU scenario. It seems that fiscal policy in the EMU scenario has a wider scope in stabilizing output and inflation, even if government is less Within this approach, we analyze how fiscal policy as a stabilization tool affects the adjustment of the current account and other macroeconomic variables to productivity and risk premium shocks.
We find that the entry into the EMU and the accompanying loss of an autonomous monetary policy makes the economy more vulnerable to a productivity shock with higher variability of output, real exchange rate and current account in the short run and higher persistence of the real exchange rate. On the contrary, for a risk premium shock, entry into EMU implies lower variability of most macroeconomic variables, e.g. output,
real exchange rate, current account, but a higher persistence in the adjustment process of the current account. For both shocks, inside as well as outside of EMU a fiscal response to the current account can help stabilizing most of macroeconomic variables, e.g. real exchange rate, net foreign assets and the current account, but at the expense of higher output variability in the short run. Hence, fiscal policy faces a trade-off between stabilizing current account and output. Table A2 : Standard deviations for a negative risk premium shock in the non-EMU scenario. 
Appendix A
Similarly, foreign goods price inflation follows a forward-looking Phillips curve and is is an exogenous AR(1) shock to imported goods inflation.
The domestic consumer price index (8) in log-linear form is therefore defined as: 
The change in the Terms of Trade (19) can be expressed in terms of the relative inflation rates between foreign goods and domestic goods:
23 For a detailed derivation see the appendix in Gali and Monacelli (2005) .
e NFA nfa P = .
Given the evolution of assets determined by the model, we may express the current account as the change in net foreign assets: 
